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Resumen
Uno de los peores problemas que puede enfrentar el banco central de una economía
emergente es la reversión repentina del flujo de capitales. Se pueden acumular reservas
internacionales como forma de aminorar el impacto de tal reversión, pero estas son rara vez
suficientes, y siempre costosas de mantener. Este artículo plantea que los bancos centrales
pueden mejorar fuertemente la eficiencia para responder a este problema si agregan a su
cartera mejores instrumentos de cobertura que aseguren sus activos financieros. Como
ilustración, se presenta un modelo cuantitativo simple de cobertura, en el que opciones y
futuros sobre el índice implícito de volatilidad (VIX) del S&P100, usados de manera óptima,
aumentan en hasta 40 por ciento la disponibilidad esperada de reservas durante un sudden
stop.
Abstract
One of the most serious problems that a central bank in an emerging market economy can
face, is the sudden reversal of capital inflows. Hoarding international reserves can be used to
smooth the impact of such reversals, but these reserves are seldom sufficient and always
expensive to hold. In this paper we argue that adding richer hedging instruments to the
portfolios held by central banks can significantly improve the efficiency of the anti-sudden
stop mechanism. We illustrate this point with a simple quantitative hedging model, where
optimally used options and futures on the S&P100’s implied volatility index (VIX), increases
the expected reserves available during sudden stops by as much as 40 percent.
________________
Prepared for the Central Bank of Chile’s conference on “External Vulnerability and
Preventive Policies,” Santiago Chile, August 2004. We are grateful to Andres Velasco and
conference participants for their comments, and to Fernando Duarte and Jose Tessada for
excellent research assistance.
E-mails: caball@mit.edu; panageas@wharton.upenn.edu.1 Introduction
One of the most serious problems that a central bank in an emerging market
economy can face, is the sudden reversal of capital inﬂows (sudden stops).
Hoarding international reserves can be used to smooth the impact of such
reversals (see, e.g., Lee (2004)), but these reserves are seldom suﬃcient and
always expensive to hold.
In Caballero and Panageas (2004) we derive and estimate a quantitative
model to assess the (uncontingent) reserves management strategy typically
followed by central banks. We conclude that this strategy is clearly inferior to
one in which portfolios include assets that are correlated with sudden stops.
As an illustration, we show that holding contracts on the S&P100 implied
volatility index (VIX) can yield a signiﬁcant reduction in the average cost of
sudden stops.
This result should not be surprising to those following the practices of
hedge funds and other leading investors. Except for extremely high frequency
events, which unfortunately sudden stops are not, institutional investors sel-
dom immobilize large amounts of “cash” to insure against jumps in volatility
and risk-aversion. The use of derivatives, and the creation of the VIX in par-
ticular, are designed precisely to satisfy hedging needs. Why should central
banks, which aside from their monetary policy mandate, are the quintessen-
tial public risk management institutions, not adopt best-risk-management
practices?
In this paper we revisit this point in the context of a simpler model de-
signed to isolate the portfolio dimension of the reserves management problem.
We estimate the key parameters of the model from the joint behavior of sud-
den stops and the VIX, which we then use to generate optimal portfolios.
We show that in an ideal setting, where countries and investors can identify
the jumps in the VIX and there exist call options on these jumps, an average
emerging market economy may expect to face a sudden stop with up to 40
percent more reserves than when these options are not included in the central
bank’s portfolio.
The main reason behind this important gain is the close relation we iden-
tify between jumps in the VIX and sudden stops. We estimate that the
1probability of a sudden stop conditional on a jump in the VIX is about four
times the probability of a sudden stop when there is no jump. Another di-
mension of the same ﬁnding but that speaks more directly of the hedging
virtues of the VIX, is that while the probability of a jump in the VIX when
there is no sudden stop in emerging markets is slightly above 30 percent, it
rises to over 70 percent when a sudden stop takes place in that year.
Section 2 in the paper presents a simple static portfolio model for a cen-
tral bank concerned with sudden stops. Section 3 presents the solution of
the model under various assumptions on hedging opportunities. Section 4
discusses implementation issues. Section 5 quantiﬁes the model. It starts by
illustrating the behavior of the VIX and its coincidence with sudden stops in
emerging markets (represented by nine economies: Argentina, Brazil, Chile,
Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Thailand and Turkey). It then estimates
the diﬀerent parameters of the model and reports the optimal portfolios for
a range of relevant parameters. Section 6 documents the impact of the dif-
ferent hedging strategies on the availability of reserves during sudden stops.
Section 7 concludes.
2B a s i c F r a m e w o r k
We analyze the investment decisions of a central bank that seeks to minimize
the real costs of a sudden stop of capital inﬂows. Our goal is to provide a
simple model to isolate the portfolio problem associated with such an objec-
tive. We refer the reader to Caballero and Panageas (2004) for a dynamic
framework that discusses the optimal path of reserves as well as the micro-
economic frictions behind sudden stops. Here we simply take from that paper
that when a sudden stop takes place, the country’s ability to use its wealth
for current consumption is signiﬁcantly curtailed. The immediate implica-
tion of such a constraint is a sharp rise in the marginal value of an extra unit
of reserves.
There are two dates in the model: date 0, when portfolio decisions are
made, and date 1, when asset returns realize and a sudden stop may take








(R1 − K − 1{SS}Z)
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where R1 denotes total reserves at date 1. K ≥ 0 is a “target” level of
reserves at date 1, which we take to be constant throughout, and captures
reasons for holding reserves other than the (short run) fear of sudden stops
we emphasize. Deviations from this target are costly: a shortfall from the
target implies that the objectives of the central bank cannot be met ade-
quately. Similarly, an excess level of reserves implies costs of accumulation
(which among other things captures the diﬀerence between the borrowing
and the lending rate, the slope of the yield curve, etc.). The term 1{SS}Z is
composed of two terms. An indicator function 1{SS} that becomes 1 during
a sudden stop (SS) and is 0 otherwise, and a constant Z>0 that controls
the need for funds during the sudden stop. This constant captures the shift
in the marginal utility of wealth that occurs once a sudden stop takes place.
Hence, by construction of the optimization problem, a central bank desires
to transfer reserves to sudden stop states. The program ((P)) is to be solved
subject to:
R0 = πP0 + B0 (1)
R1 = B1 + πP1
where R0 is the initial level of reserves, π is the amount of risky securities
held by the central bank, P0 is the price of such securities and P1 is the
(stochastic) payoﬀ of these assets at t =1 . B0 i st h ea m o u n to fu n c o n t i n g e n t
bonds held by the central bank, whose interest rate we ﬁxt o0 for simplicity,
so that B1 = B0,a n d
R1 = R0 + π(P1 − P0).
Replacing this expression in ((P)) and computing the ﬁrst order conditions
with respect to R0 and π,y i e l d s :





3where we have removed Merton’s portfolio term by assuming fair-risk-neutral
pricing of the risky asset (an assumption we maintain throughout):
E[P1]=P0.
There are three observations about this simple setup worth highlighting
at this stage. First, the central bank has an aversion to over-accumulating
reserves. If Z =0and K =0 , then R0 =0 . Under these circumstances, the
central bank achieves the maximum of the objective. Our main concern in
this paper is with those reserves that are due to the possibility of a costly
sudden stop, Z>0.
Second, the level of reserves invested at date 0, R0,i si n d e p e n d e n to f
the portfolio, π, or the properties of the risky asset. This is due to the
“certainty-equivalence” property of the quadratic model. In fact, with more
general preferences that exhibit a prudence motive, such as a the CRRA,
an increase in hedging (π) reduces the total amount of reserves held (see
Caballero and Panageas, 2004).
Third, and most importantly, risky assets are not held if P1 is uncorrelated
with the sudden stop, 1{SS}. Risky assets are only held to the extent that
they succeed in creating attractive payoﬀs during sudden stops, i.e., as long
as:1
E [P1|SS =1 ]>E[P1|SS =0 ].
3 From Conventional Reserves to Hedges
Let us characterize the solution for a few cases of special interest. Our ﬁrst
base case model assumes away hedging completely, which is not far from
what central banks do in practice. The second case is an Arrow-Debreu setup
where contracts can be written contingent on the sudden stop. It captures
the opposite extreme. The third is an intermediate case, that allows for
“proxy” hedging through contracts that are correlated, but not perfectly,
with sudden stops.
1Where we have re-normalized all potential assets to be held in positive amounts.
43.1 No Hedging
Assume that we set π =0in the base case model and drop the optimization
with respect to π. Then obviously:
B0 = R0 = K +P r ( SS)Z. (4)
As one might expect, the possibility of a sudden stop induces the country
to hold reserves beyond the “target” level K. This is probably one the main
reasons why Chile, for example, holds four to ﬁve times as much reserves as
Australia or Canada.
3.2 Hedging with Arrow-Debreu Securities
Taking the opposite extreme, assume that there exists an asset that pays:
½
1 if SS =1
0 if SS =0
In this case our assumption of fair-pricing implies
P0 =P r ( SS).
It follows from (3) and the fact that in this case:
Cov(1{SS},P 1)=Va r(1{SS})=Va r(P1)
that
π = Z. (5)
Replacing this expression in (1) and (2) we obtain:
B0 = K +P r ( SS)(Z − π)=K.
Not surprisingly, with perfect Arrow Debreu securities (and fair pricing)
the central bank will completely hedge away the sudden stop risk, so that:
R1 − 1{SS}Z = B0 = K.
5Now let us express the portfolio of Arrow-Debreu securities as a propor-






K +P r ( SS)Z
.
In the interesting special case where K =0(corresponding to the case
where the country ﬁnds it optimal to hold no reserves in the absence of
sudden stops) we have that:
φ =1 .
That is, all resources are invested in Arrow Debreu securities.
3.3 The intermediate case
In reality, one neither observes Arrow Debreu securities nor does one observe
contracts written contingent on the sudden stop (at least in an amount suf-
ﬁcient to insulate the country from it). There are good reasons for that:
in practice, the sudden stop itself is unlikely to be fully contractible since
its occurrence may depend on a country’s actions and private information.
Hence the practical relevance of the simple model proposed above rests crit-
ically on whether there are assets and trading strategies that could function
as good substitutes for the idealized assets envisaged above. Let us develop a
simple extension to the Arrow Debreu world above, by introducing an asset
that pays 1 when an event that we call J happens (corresponding to, e.g., a
discrete drop in some asset price). We introduce the notation:
ψ
h =P r ( SS =1 |J =1 )
ψ
l =P r ( SS =1 |J =0 )
η =P r ( J =1 )
ψ =P r ( SS =1 )=ηψ






In this case it is suboptimal for the country to invest all of its assets in

















B0 = K + ψZ − πη.
Notice that these formulas encompass the ones obtained previously. If
ψ
h = ψ
l then the two indicators are independent and thus π =0 .H o w e v e r ,
as ψ
h → 1 and ψ
l → 0,t h e nψ → η and the country insures the sudden stop
completely. Short of that, the central bank ﬁnds it optimal to do some of
the hedging of sudden stops with uncontingent reserves: If ψ
h < 1,t h e r ei s
a chance that the risky asset does not deliver during a sudden stop. And if
ψ
l > 0, the country pays for protection that does not need from the risky
asset.2













This expression has a natural interpretation. Let x ∈ [0,1] represent






Due to quadratic utility this number is independent of the hedging instru-
ments (notice that the properties of J do not inﬂuence this number). Then









That is, the portfolio is composed of three terms: the ﬁrst one is the fraction
of reserves used for the prevention of sudden stops, x.3 The second captures
2Note that with quadratic utility it suﬃces that ψ
l =0and ψ
h > 0 for the country to
invest its entire portfolio in the risky asset (for K =0 ). The proximity of ψ
h to one only
determines how much hedging is achieved by this strategy.
3Note that our sense of prevention is diﬀe r e n tf r o mt h a ti nG a r c i aa n dS o t o( t h i s
volume) where a stock of reserves is needed to prevent runs on the country. Their concept
is subsumed in our ﬁxed K, although if runs are related to factors that tighten international
ﬁnancial markets, then this term also should be analyzed as an optimal portfolio decision.
7the relative frequency of jumps and sudden stops; as this rises the price of
the insurance rises. The third one is the diﬀerence between the probability
of a jump conditional on a sudden stop taking and not taking place. The
latter term captures the risky asset’s ability to transfer resources to the states
where they are needed the most.
Dividing φ by x isolates the share of the risky asset in the component of
reserves used for hedging sudden stops. This is the concept we emphasize
henceforth by setting x =1(or K =0 ).
4 Implementation issues
Let us now take the analysis one step closer to actual assets. For this purpose,
we start by specifying a state variable, st, that is correlated with sudden stops
but is not under the country’s “control.” Assume that st evolves according
to the (discretized) stochastic diﬀerential equation:
st+1 − st = µ(st)∆t + σN(0,1)
√
∆t + εdJ1 (8)
where µ(st) is the drift (the mean appreciation rate of the state variable),
and σ is the volatility. The most interesting part of this expression is the
jump process dJ1,w h i c hi sz e r oe x c e p ta td a t e1, when it takes the value
one with probability η and zero otherwise, in perfect analogy to the setup in
section 3.3. We let ε be a random variable normally distributed, with mean
µε > 0 a n ds t a n d a r dd e v i a t i o nσε.
4.1 Call Options
Given the above framework, we consider the following thought experiment:
Is there a simple strategy that can “create” an asset of the sort envisaged in
section 3.3 by writing contracts contingent on st? The answer is yes. To see
this, take the continuous time limit of (8) and consider a contract with an
investment bank or insurer in which the central bank pays an amount κdt in
exchange for each dollar received if st exhibits a jump at t =1 .I nc o n t i n u o u s
time such a contract is well deﬁned. In reality, one can approximate it by
signing a sequence of appropriate (suﬃciently out of the money) “digital”
8options (furthermore, such options can be well approximated by regular puts
and calls) which cost ηdt p e ru n i to ft i m e .T h ec o s to fs u c hap o s i t i o no v e r
the full period is: Z 1
0
ηdt = η
and the payoﬀ is one if a jump happens at t =1 , and zero otherwise. Notice
that this strategy is also feasible if one extends the model to the case where
aj u m pi nst c a nh a p p e na ta n yt i m eτ as in Caballero and Panageas (2004).
In fact, this is the process we estimate in the empirical section.
In conclusion, this sequence of short term “digital” options is for all prac-
tical purposes identical to the contract described in section 3.3.4
4.2 Futures contracts
Consider now simple futures contracts. If investors are risk neutral with
respect to st risk, a futures contract on st with maturity at t =1can be
entered into at a forward “price” of:
P0 = E [s1]
with return:
s1 − E [s1|s0].
The expected payoﬀ of such a position at t =1is approximately:5
e υ ∼ N(−ηµε,σ)+1 {J}N (µε,σ ε).
where {J} corresponds to an indicator function that takes value one when a
jump in the state variable takes place, and zero otherwise.
It is important to note that futures have a price of zero. However, in
order to keep the analysis comparable with the results obtained in section
3.3 we consider a slight variation of a futures contract and assume that the
4We refer the reader to Caballero and Panageas (2004) for a more extensive discussion
of these issues.
5To make the argument in this section exact one needs a continuous time model.
9country must pay ηµε u p f r o n tf o re v e r yc o n t r a c tt h a ti te n t e r si ne x c h a n g e
for a payoﬀ of :
υ ∼ N(0,σ)+1 {J}N (µε,σ ε).





















B0 = K + ψZ − πηµε
There are several observations about π that are worth highlighting. First,
we can set µε =1without loss of generality, since the dollar amount invested
in the risky asset is πµε at a price of η per dollar invested. Moreover, observe
that the right hand side depends only on the ratios σ
µε, σε
µε. Hence from now
on let us set µε =1and denote e σ = σ
µε and similarly for e σε,e π.T h u s , i n
dollar amounts we have:




l¢ 1 − η
e σ2




Comparing (9) to (6) shows that the amount invested in risky assets
declines when going from digital options on the jump to the simple futures
(the denominator is larger in (9)). The ratio between the two portfolios is:
1 − η
e σ2




which declines as e σ,e σε increase. This is intuitive: The more noise there is in
the hedging opportunities, the less appealing they become to a risk averse
central bank. Note that the portfolio φ also is attenuated by the ratio in
(10).
To summarize, we have that in order to justify adding a risky asset to
the central bank’s holdings, sudden stops must be severe, and the risky asset
must be suﬃciently correlated with such events. On the other hand, it is
important to emphasize that neither causality nor predictability of sudden
stops and returns are part of the argument for a positive π.
105 Quantitative Assessment
The theoretical argument for hedging is diﬃcult to argue with. The relevant
question is then an empirical one: Are there global ﬁnancial instruments and
indices that oﬀer good enough hedging opportunities against sudden stops?
Obviously, the answer to this question is to a large extent country-speciﬁc,
as not all emerging market economies are exposed to the same sources of
fragility. Our goal in this section is more modest but also more robust:
Rather than performing a collection of cases studies, we show that there is at
least one global asset that has signiﬁcant correlation with emerging market
crises. More importantly, absent better country-speciﬁc alternatives, this
global asset should constitute a signiﬁcant share of these countries portfolios.
5.1 The basics: Sudden Stops and Jumps
We study a group of nine emerging market economies open to international
capital markets during the 1990s for which we have complete data:6 Ar-
gentina, Brazil, Chile, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Thailand and
Turkey. These economies are representative of what is often referred to as
“emerging market economies.” Our main exclusion is the group of Eastern
and Central European economies, who became signiﬁcant participants in in-
ternational capital markets during the second half of the 1990s, but faced
economic problems of a somewhat diﬀerent nature during much of our sam-
ple.
The ﬁrst point to highlight is the well known fact that there is signiﬁ-
cant comovement in private capital ﬂows to these economies. Figure 1 splits
into two panels the paths of the change in capital ﬂows –more precisely, the
diﬀerence between contiguous four-quarter-moving averages of quarterly cap-
ital ﬂows– to each of these economies from 1992 to 2002. The shaded areas
mark the periods corresponding to the systemic Tequila crisis, Asian crisis,
and Russian crisis, and the sequence of somewhat less systemic Turkish-
Argentinean-Brazilean crises. It is apparent from this ﬁgure that there are
signiﬁcant correlations across these ﬂows, especially within regions. Turkey
6The exception is Malaysia, for which we do not have quarterly capital ﬂows.
11is somewhere in between the two regions. These comovements are encourag-





















Capital flows for Latin American countries
































Capital flows for East Asian countries and Turkey











Figure 1: Capital ﬂo w sf o rv a r i o u sc o u n t r i e s .T h eﬁgure depicts the diﬀerence
between 4 quarter averages of capital ﬂo w sa n dt h es a m eq u a n t i t yo n ey e a r
before. The shaded areas show times of major crises.
The second, and main point, is that indeed there are clearly identiﬁable
global factors – in fact, traded factors – correlated with emerging market
sudden stops. The key in ﬁnding such factors is to note that these episodes
are generally understood as times when investors are reluctant to partici-
pate in risky markets. The VIX precisely captures this reluctance and is
available in the US since 1986. This is an index of the “implied volatilities”
from puts and calls (typically 8) on the S&P 100. (Implied volatilities are
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Figure 2: Daily VIX series. The gray areas depict the periods of major crises.
determined by using the Black and Scholes (1973) formula to determine the
level of volatility that would be compatible with the observed prices of puts
and calls). Figure 2 reproduces the shaded areas for sudden stops regions
described in the previous graph, and plots the daily VIX. It is apparent in
this ﬁgure that some of the largest “jumps” in the VIX occur precisely during
sudden stops. In fact, the only systemic sudden stop that does not coincide
with a jump is the Tequila crisis, where there was a rise in the VIX but not
large enough to count as a distinct jump.
In the next section we document formally the joint behavior of sudden
stops and jumps in the VIX. But before doing so, it is instructive to explore in
more detail the behavior of the VIX during the two largest systemic crises of
the 1990s (the Asian and Russian crises). The top panel in Figure 3 plots the
13path of the VIX during the last two weeks of October 1997 (the onset of the
Asian Crisis), while the bottom panel does the same for August-September
1998, which corresponds to the peak of the Russian/LTCM crisis. In these
events the VIX reaches levels above 30 and 45 percent, respectively, which
are close to the maximum levels of the index. In a matter of days, the VIX
doubled.






















Figure 3: Plots of the VIX in the weeks surrounding major crises in interna-
tional ﬁnancial markets.
Finally, Figure 4 reinforces the message of high correlation by plotting
the path of the VIX together with the EMBI for three of the most fragile
economies in emerging markets during recent years: Argentina, Brazil and
Turkey. Again, the dips in the corresponding EMBIs as the VIX experiences
14sharp rises are apparent.7 A variable that is primarily meant to capture the
“feelings” of investors in US equity markets, happens to be highly correlated
with the fortunes of emerging market economies. This highlights another
important aspect of our methodology, according to which the only require-
m e n tf o rav a r i a b l el i k et h eV I Xt ob eu s e f u li nh e d g i n g ,i st h a tt h e r eb ea
change in the conditional probability of having a crisis in emerging markets





















Figure 4: The VIX and the EMBI for Argentina, Brazil and Turkey.
In concluding this section we stress that our claim is not that domestic
factors do not play a paramount role in crises. Quite the contrary, our choice
of Argentina, Brazil and Turkey in the previous ﬁgure is precisely because
7The EMBI data are from Datastream. Note that the Argentine (permanent) crash
also coincides with a spike in the VIX.
15their own domestic weaknesses make them more responsive to global factors.
Importantly, this compounding eﬀect often raises rather than dampens the
need for hedging global risk factors.
5.2 Quantiﬁcation
We now turn into a structural analysis of the correlations highlighted above.
5.2.1 Estimation of the VIX process
To operationalize the model of the previous section take the log(VIX) to be
the state variable st, which follows the continuous time process:
dst = −θ(log(st) − y)dt + σdBt + εdJt.
This is the continuous time limit of (8), with the modiﬁcation that jumps can
happen at any point in time.8 The functional form µ(st)=−θ(log(st) − y),
corresponds to an AR(1) process in discrete time for the log(st).T h u s ,w e
start by estimating an AR(1) process for log(VIX) with monthly data and
focus on the residuals, υ, which are distributed (for small ∆t) roughly as
υ ∼ (1 − p)N(−ηµε∆t,σ
√
∆t)+pN (µε,σε).
Given the very few observations with jumps, we identify these directly by
inspection; this process ﬁxes η =0 .417 and hence p =1−e−η∆t. The rest of
the parameters are estimated by maximum likelihood of the mixing of two
normal distributions. Table 1 reports the results.
ηµ   σσ  
Estimate 0.417 0.356 0.353 0.047
Table 1: Estimated parameters for monthly VIX data
8This is not a serious departure if the “horizon” in the decision model is understood to
be one year and the probability of more than 1 jump taking place in a single year is small.
165.2.2 The Likelihood of Sudden Stops
The results in section 5.2.1 suggest the presence of ﬁve jumps in the VIX
in our sample: The gulf war, the Asian crisis, the Russian crisis, 9/11 and
the simultaneous crisis of Turkey/Brazil, and the corporate scandals in the
US. Conditional on these jumps, we calculate the probability that a country
experiences a sudden stop. We identify an observation as a sudden stop
based on a mixture of information on capital ﬂows reversals and reserves
losses (see Caballero and Panageas 2004). Mainly, for an observation to
count as a sudden stop capital ﬂows must decline by at least 5 percent of
GDP with respect to the ﬂows in the previous two years, and reserves must
be declining. This procedure yields estimates of ψ
h and ψ
l for each country.
We then estimate ψ from the relation:
ψ = ηψ
h +( 1− η)ψ
l.
The results are reported in Table 2. Note, however, that the country-
speciﬁc estimates are highly imprecise as they correspond to the product of
binary variables with very few transitions in each case.9 For this reason,
we pool the observations, which yields the result in the average row. We
also report results for two sub-categories: High-risk economies (Argentina,
Brazil, and Turkey) and for the East-Asian economies. The former group is
composed of those economies that have the highest estimated likelihood of a
sudden stop in the sample.
The pooled estimate indicates that an average emerging market economy
is more than four times more likely to experience a crisis at a time when
the VIX has jumped than when it has not. Again, this is not a statement
of causation but of correlation. At times when the VIX spikes, the average
emerging market economy has a 41 percent chance of experiencing a sudden
stop. This chance drops to 11 percent when the VIX is tranquil.
9The case of Mexico is particularly revealing. The estimate of ψ
h =0misses the fact
that while Mexico did not experience a very signiﬁcant capital ﬂow reversal during the
Russian/LTCM/Brazilean turmoil, its stock market declined very sharply, reﬂecting that
it experienced signiﬁcant pressure at the time, but adjusted primarily via prices instead
of quantities. Chile and the East Asian countries have a ψ
l =0because we identify only




Argentina 0.42 0.80 0.14
Brasil 0.42 0.60 0.29
Chile 0.17 0.40 0.00
Mexico 0.17 0.00 0.29
Indonesia 0.17 0.40 0.00
Korea 0.08 0.20 0.00
Malaysia 0.25 0.40 0.14
Thailand 0.17 0.40 0.00
Turkey 0.33 0.60 0.14
Average 0.24 0.41 0.11
High-risk Countries 0.39 0.67 0.19
East Asia 0.17 0.35 0.04
Table 2: Estimates for ψ, ψ
h and ψ
l. ψ
h is estimated as the number of years
when we observe a joint jump in the VIX and a SS in the country divided
by the number of jumps in the VIX. Symmetrically, ψ
l is the ratio of the
n u m b e ro fy e a r si nS Sw h e nt h e r ew a sn oj u m pd i v i d e di nt h et o t a ln u m b e r
of years without a jump. In order to determine whether a SS and a jump
coincide we allow for a 2-quarter window around the date when we identify
the jump, because jumps are identiﬁed at a higher frequency than SS. With
the estimates for η, ψ
l and ψ
h in hand we obtain the estimate for ψ presented
in the ﬁrst column of the table.











High-risk Countries 0.51 0.10
East Asia 0.79 0.16
Table 3: Representative portfolios for options and futures.
5.3 Representative VIX-portfolios and Reserves Gains
W i t ht h e s en u m b e r si nh a n dw ea r ea b l et oo p e r a t i o n a l i z ef o r m u l a s( 7 )a n d
(10) to estimate the portfolios implied by the model. Again, country speciﬁc
numbers are very imprecise and attention should be placed on the pooled
results. Table 3 reports the portfolios. The values of φ are large. The futures
contracts show shares of risky assets of 10 percent or higher for the diﬀerent
g r o u p i n g s ,d e s p i t et h el a r g ea m o u n to fn o i s ei nt h eV I X .W h e nt h en o i s ei s
removed and the call-options strategy is followed, the shares rise to above 50
percent in all cases, and to near 80 percent for the Asian economies. The
reason for the high share for East Asian economies is worth highlighting: in
t h es a m p l et h e ye x p e r i e n c ec r i s e sm o s t l yw h e nt h e s ea r es y s t e m i c( a g a i n ,t h i s
is not a causal statement); this is in contrast with the high risk economies,
which also experience idiosyncratic crises.10
These are dramatically diﬀerent portfolios from those normally held by
central banks in emerging markets. Finding out why seems imperative: Is it
10Note also that the diﬀerence between the optimal precautionary behavior of a high
risk and an average economy is not only reﬂected in the diﬀerent φs but also on the level
of reserves held. Recall that R0 = K + ψZ.
19the lack of liquidity of the potential markets, domestic political constraints,
or simply institutional herding?
6 The Beneﬁts
Our reduced form portfolio model is not well suited for a thorough “wel-
fare” comparison. Thus, in assessing the beneﬁts of the hedging strategy, we
rather focus on statistics that are robust across preferences and other hard to
quantify details. In particular, we report the expected gains conditional on
a sudden stop taking place. We illustrate this for the call-options scenario.
The ﬁrst step in computing this statistic is to estimate the likelihood of
a jump given that the country has experienced a sudden stop. Using Bayes’
r u l e ,w eh a v et h a t :




Column 1 in Table 4 reports the estimates. It is around 70 percent for an
average emerging market economy and close to 90 percent for the relatively
stable East Asian economies. This is important. The VIX jumps with a high
likelihood at times when the countries need it to do so.
The rate of return of the “call” strategy is:
½
1/η − 1 if J =1
−1 if J =0 .













Column 2 in Table 4 reports the results. For an average economy, the ex-
pected gain is around 40 percent. That is, an average economy following
the strategy described here can expect a 40 percent rise in its reserves upon
entering into a sudden stop.11 This is a signiﬁcant number, which exceeds
11Of course, the counterpart of this expected gain during sudden stops is that the
economy may expect to lose 13 percent of its reserves when there is no sudden stop.











High-risk Countries 0.71 0.36
East Asia 0.88 0.86
Table 4: Revised probabilities and Expected Gains when following the op-
tions strategy.
the actual reserves losses of many of these economies during their respective
sudden stops.
Of course, there are many caveats that can be raised and that are likely
to reduce these large numbers. For example, in a dynamic model the central
bank might ﬁnd it optimal to hold a level of reserves above a certain mini-
mum in all contingencies, even in “good” states. In the present model this is
just equivalent to assuming that the central bank targets a non-zero level of
reserves, i.e. K>0, which implies x<1. As we know from expression (7),
the portfolio of risky assets is scaled down proportionally with x.A l t e r n a -
tively, one could imagine a situation where a central bank wishes under no
circumstances to lose more than c percent of its reserves, in which case the
optimal portfolio would become:
min{c,φ}.
All these caveats notwithstanding, we feel that the above calculations
make a simple point: no matter which assumptions we make about pref-
erences and constraints, the driving force behind our results is the strong
21correlation between the VIX index and the incidence of sudden stops. The
simple quadratic framework that we propose is particularly well suited to
make this separation between preferences (which solely aﬀect x) and corre-
lation explicit. Even though a more elaborate model like that in Caballero
and Panageas (2004) is required in order to have a satisfactory theory for
x,t h ee ﬀects that come from the strong correlations are independent of the
speciﬁcs of the model.
7F i n a l R e m a r k s
We shall start our conclusion with a disclaimer. The portfolios we illustrate
for the emerging market economies we study, and the emphasis on the VIX,
are neither country-speciﬁc nor instrument-speciﬁc recommendations. Our
goal is simply to illustrate the potential beneﬁts of enriching the portfolio
options for central banks and, most importantly, of searching for assets and
indices that are global in nature but correlated with capital ﬂow reversals.
Within this limited goal, our results are promising: the expected gains in
reserves during sudden stops can be signiﬁcant (slightly less than 40 percent
of reserves for an average country). This is noteworthy, considering that we
are only considering a single risky asset which is not optimized to capture
the risks faced by emerging market economies.
The latter point raises an issue of international ﬁnancial architecture: The
VIX is useful because it is correlated with implied volatilities and risks in
emerging markets but it also captures problems that are US-speciﬁc. Ideally,
one would want an index that weights diﬀerently US-events that are likely
to have world-wide systemic eﬀects from those that do not. It should be
relatively easy to construct implied volatility indices that isolate the former
factors and still preserve the country-exogeneity properties of the VIX. Con-
structing such indices is important to create benchmarks and develop liquid
hedging markets for economies exposed to capital ﬂow volatility.
A ni s s u et h a tw ea v o i d e de n t i r e l yi st h ei n c e n t i v ee ﬀects that a modiﬁed
central banks’ policy of hedging external shocks may have on the private sec-
tor. This is an important concern, as the private sector may undo some of the
external insurance in anticipation of a the central bank’s intervention. This
22is a complex issue that probably requires coordination of the hedging pol-
icy with monetary and regulatory policies (see Caballero and Krishnamurthy
2003). However, even in the absence of these complementary policies, per-
verse incentive eﬀects are unlikely to be strong enough to fully oﬀset the
justiﬁcation for more aggressive hedging practices. After all, current reserve
policies also suﬀer from these problems and are justiﬁed on the grounds that
many in the private sector are simply not forward-looking enough to hedge
aggregate risks in suﬃcient amount.
Moreover, if such practices were to be adopted collectively, soon we would
observe the emergence of new implied volatility indices that better match
the needs of emerging market economies. The welfare improvement from
such enhancements could be very signiﬁcant and therefore may justify a
coordination role by the IFIs and central banks around the world. In fact,
such coordination may be a necessity, if we are to limit the potential political
costs from hedging losses.
To conclude, we reiterate that our emphasis on external sources of cap-
ital ﬂow volatility does not seek to shift the blame for much of capital ﬂow
volatility away from the countries themselves. Our goal is simply to show
that there is a hedgable component and that this component is signiﬁcant.
Moreover, there is an important interaction between the issue we highlight
here and the domestic sources of external fragility: Weak countries are more
likely to be hit by global turmoil, and hence should put an even bigger eﬀort
in hedging these global shocks.
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